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This thesis paper examines the impact of volatility of international capital flow on emerging 
market economies (EMEs). The paper addresses the relationship between short-term capi-
tal flow surges, such as portfolio investment and debt inflows, their volatility and impact on 
economic growth. The research is based on theoretical and empirical foundations for a se-
lected number of EMEs, which experienced great capital flow volatility and crises in the past 
3 decades. The main results of the paper illustrate that liberalization of short-term capital 
flows to the economies with weak financial regulation and capital controls as well as low 
quality of institutions can lead to economic crashes, financial crises, macroeconomic imbal-
ances and raise financial stability risks.  
 
Thesis paper also examines the domestic debt composition of EMEs and essentially deter-
mines how debt composition impacts the dynamics of capital flows and their volatility in 
EMEs, thus, causing macroeconomic disturbance or even financial crises. The main results 
of the paper showcase that volatility of capital flows could lead to financial instability and 
macroeconomic imbalances, thereby contradicting the very essence of the neoliberal policy 
agenda.  
 
Therefore, key results of the research demonstrate that there is a need for more robust 
policies and capital controls to tackle large short-term capital inflows and outflows amid the 
rising volatility of short-term capital flows in EMEs.    
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1 Introduction 
 
The neoliberal policy agenda has been the major policy approach in both emerging mar-
ket economies (EMEs) and advanced economies (AEs) for the last three decades: since 
the 1980s, many EMEs have experienced a strong trend towards financial liberalization 
and, therefore, have adopted policies in order to advance domestic competition by de-
regulation and openness to foreign capital. According to the index of competition, which 
accounts for structural reforms toward financial liberalization, countries such as Chile 
brought the value of the index to the levels of frontier economies and the USA in partic-
ular (Ostry et. al., 2016). While some may point out the considerable benefits of financial 
globalization, e.g. that it channels international capital flows to its most productive areas, 
while promoting risk-sharing and economic growth by removing barriers toward integra-
tion within financial sector, such evidence is less clear-cut for EMEs (Ostry et. al., 2016). 
Indeed, many EMEs were going in the direction of financial globalization and even a step 
further, into the financialization of their economies. Being qualitatively different term from 
‘globalization of finance’, financialization is associated with the Anglo-Saxon world, that 
is the advanced economies such as those of US and UK. The causes of financialization 
in EMEs that can be quantified are foreign financial inflows, the shift from bank-based to 
market-based financial systems, financial liberalization, which spurs asset price inflation 
and increases debt, and household indebtedness among other factors (Karwowski and 
Stockhammer, 2016). Nevertheless, financialization in AEs and EMEs was highly criti-
cized by many economists and policy makers. For example, Arcand et. al. (2012) em-
phasized that there can be “too much” finance even in AEs, meaning there can be a 
threshold beyond which financial depth and its development has no beneficial outcomes 
for economic growth. Thus, capital inflows to EMEs constitute a major part of financial 
integration and in some cases financialization of EMEs that has brought more damaging 
consequences rather than positive ramifications for economic growth.         
 
Another aspect concerns the type of flows that are being considered: while long-term 
capital flows, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and other equity flows, do seem 
to boost long-term economic growth in AEs and EMEs, short-term flows, such as Foreign 
Portfolio Investments (FPI) and portfolio debt inflows, are rather volatile in nature and 
neither do promote long-term growth nor share risks with other trading partners (Ostry 
et. al., 2016).  
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The integration of EMEs into the global economy is thus characterized by the pro-cyclical 
capital inflow cycles that were followed by sudden economic crashes. The most promi-
nent of those ‘sudden stops’ – sharp slowdown of private capital inflows and reversal into 
small current account deficits – were the 1990’s crises that happened in Latin America 
and East Asian countries, such as the ‘Tequila crisis’ in Mexico in 1995, the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-1998, followed by the crisis in Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999 and 
Argentina in 2001 (Bonizzi, 2013). Therefore, the academic debate is now focused on 
the relationship of capital inflow volatility, its determinants and macroeconomic imbal-
ances in EMEs. The research focus of this thesis paper is on the volatility and surges in 
short-term capital flows such as FPI, debt, banking and other flows as they are more 
volatile in nature than long-term flows such as FDI.  
 
In order to study and test such interdependency, it is necessary to understand the key 
drivers for surges of short-term capital inflows and sudden outflows. This thesis paper 
emphasizes that the drivers for capital outflows in the current macroeconomic environ-
ment vary by the type of inflow and, therefore, cannot be applied universally.  The con-
ceptual framework for understanding the dynamics of capital flows is constructed within 
a “push” and “pull” framework, where push factors are usually global factors that affect 
all EMEs while pull factors are domestic ones and refer to the attractiveness of various 
countries for investment opportunities (Moghadam et. al., 2011). Push and pull criteria 
are also considered along with cyclical and structural factors. The main argument of the 
thesis paper is that international short-term capital flows mostly have an adverse impact 
on long-term economic growth in EMEs with weak financial systems and consequently 
could lead to macroeconomic imbalances or even financial crises, as was evidenced in 
the empirical analysis of secondary research sources.  
 
This thesis is structured as follows: chapter two provides comprehensive literature review 
on the topic of capital flows in EMEs and the academic debate on capital flows liberali-
zation following the volatility of short-term capital inflows; chapter 3 presents a concep-
tual model – the “push” and “pull” framework – and a model for measuring the volatility 
of capital flows as well as the relationship of capital inflows and crises in EMEs adapted 
from Ghosh et. al. (2016) for empirical analysis of the EMEs, which experienced macro-
economic disturbance as a result of short-term surges of capital flows, and the behavior 
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of capital flows and economic growth in selected EMEs, building on the previous availa-
ble literature and models; chapter 4 delivers the analysis of capital flows over time, by 
type and source of flow, individual flows components, the results of push and pull frame-
work analysis as well as examination of EMEs debt structure and dynamics of short-term 
capital flows, increased participation of foreign asset managers and other investors in 
EMEs local currency bonds and accumulating international reserves, outlining key driv-
ers, possible spillover effects from AEs to EMEs; chapter 5 gives some policy implica-
tions, relying on the main findings of the previous research of this paper and findings 
from major institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF). Finally, the last chap-
ter gives a short summary that concludes the analysis of short-term capital flows, their 
volatility and adverse consequences for EMEs.     
2  Literature Review 
 
2.1 Research question and its relevance  
 
Recently the academic literature experienced a shift in thinking and analysis of interna-
tional capital flows to EMEs and their effects. As EMEs were becoming more integrated 
in the world economy and opened for foreign capital, they started to exhibit high volatility 
of short-term capital flows, which has resulted in several economic crashes. The funda-
mental problem of financialization in EMEs, according to Epstein (2005, p.12) is all about 
“speculative and excessively liquid financial flows that create debt-laden balance sheets, 
overly short-term perspectives, volatility and mispricing of important asset prices, 
including exchange rates, and subsequent misallocation of resources and unstable 
economic growth”. Therefore, the need for capital controls has gained importance again 
in the current academic literature and research from major international organizations 
such as the IMF.  
 
One of the prominent shifts was the paradigm change in the IMF Finance and Develop-
ment report, published in June 2016, and dedicated to Africa, in particular the article 
‘Neoliberalism: Oversold?’ (Ostry et. al., 2016). Traditionally being the advocates of fi-
nancial liberalization, IMF authors now argue that capital inflows to EMEs and financial 
liberalization do not necessarily yield beneficial results, such as greater economic growth 
and risk-sharing with trading countries. According to the article, it is rather dependent on 
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the type of inflows being considered: while long term inflows, such as FDI, do seem to 
provide economic value to the countries with weak institutions and financial systems, 
short-term inflows, such as FPI, banking and other debt flows, on the other hand, do not 
seem to boost economic growth but rather increase financial volatility and crisis fre-
quency. Ghosh, Ostry and Qureshi (2016) have published a paper in the American Eco-
nomic Review, where they have indicated the synchronized behavior of capital inflows 
and consecutive crash landings, with the major crises that happened in 1997 – the Asian 
Financial Crisis –, 2007-2008 – the Global Financial Crisis –, 2011 – the European Sov-
ereign Debt crisis and US sovereign debt downgrade –, and 2013 – the “Taper Tantrum” 
–, which had negative spillover effects on EMEs and some of their currencies.  
 
This thesis aims to tackle the research issues raised in the previous and emerging liter-
ature and the IMF publication mentioned above in particular. The question of cyclical 
behavior of short-term capital flows and subsequent economic disturbance has some 
evident policy implications for EMEs that raise the importance of capital controls and risk 
management in general. Considering a little amount of literature by comparison in major 
economic and financial academic journals in the last decade that would address such 
problem, this paper addresses this research gap by theoretical and empirical analysis, 
yielded from secondary sources, of the relationship between volatility of short-term for-
eign capital flows and crises in some EMEs, particularly in BRIC economies. More spe-
cifically, the main research questions of the paper are the following:  
 
1) Is there a cyclical relationship between short-term capital flow surges, 
such as portfolio investment, banking and other debt flows, their volatility 
and subsequent economic disturbance in EMEs, leading to potential fi-
nancial crises?  
2) What policies and prudential measures shall be implemented to tackle 
capital flow volatility in EMEs? 
 
 
Foreign capital flows are characterized as among the most important ingredients of fi-
nancial globalization and the main driver for economic growth (Carp, 2014). Thus, in 
order to answer the above questions, it is necessary to understand the relationship be-
tween foreign capital flows and economic growth in EMEs. Although such a relationship 
is rather complex, the paper takes into account the considerable amount of previous 
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literature on the topic of capital account liberalization and applies it to answer the re-
search questions above.       
2.2 The research problem and the relevant literature  
 
The research gap among academic literature in the last decade lies in the relationship 
between surges of short term capital inflows, their volatility and subsequent crises in 
EMEs. While some authors from the IMF have already started to address this issue, this 
paper builds on their findings and on more general academic debate on the efficacy and 
beneficial impacts of short-term capital flows.     
 
Although there is a little amount of literature by comparison after Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), dedicated to the relationship between short-term capital inflows surges and eco-
nomic disturbance and crises in EMEs, there is a vast amount of academic literature on 
financial globalization and capital account liberalization as well as its implications to 
EMEs. The main sources of literature, reviewed and analyzed below, are coming from 
EBSCOhost online database, Business Source Elite in particular. Out of 218 search re-
sults for “capital flows_emerging markets” that constitute a full sample of available liter-
ature on capital flows to emerging markets, the most promising and appropriate papers 
are found in various academic journals, such as American Economic Review, Journal of 
International Money and Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Procedia Economics 
and Finance, and The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. In addition, the re-
search from international organizations, such as IMF, Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER) are very valuable for the analysis 
of ongoing changes in the macroeconomic environment and advancements in certain 
policies concerning capital flows in EMEs.  The more specific streams of literature could 
be characterized in the following segments: the macroeconomic effects of equity and 
debt capital flows to EMEs; the key drivers and determinants of capital flows volatility 
with regard to different kinds of flows; the relationship between capital flows volatility and 
economic growth and, lastly, controls on capital inflows and outflows, their applicability 
and consequences.  
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More generally, the paper derives the research from the literature streams that could be 
summarized as in the Figure 1 below:     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. General Literature streams. Source: International Institute of Finance (IFF), 
2015; own research. 
 
The crises of 1990s have alerted policy makers and academia that short term capital 
inflows could bring more economic volatility and result in crises. After the East Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, the IMF (1998) has proposed that short-term capital controls, in 
particular taxes on short-term inflows, are perhaps beneficial in promoting more capital 
inflows to EMEs. However, it was still a light touch on the effects of short-term capital 
flows on EMEs: the relationship between short-term inflows volatility and economic 
growth had to be analyzed further due to lack of data for empirical analysis.  
 
The most prominent critic of neoliberalism and its advocates such as IMF and World 
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz (2000) has made a clear statement on regulation of short-term 
capital flows after the East Asian crisis of 1997. In his work titled “Capital Market Liber-
alization, Economic Growth and Instability” (2000), Stiglitz has questioned the applica-
bility of full capital account liberalization, particularly stressing the importance of impos-
ing interventions on short-term capital flows that are more volatile than e.g. FDI, as was 
implemented by China and India – countries less affected during East Asian crisis of 
1997 – where China “has managed to attract huge amounts of foreign direct investment 
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while maintaining controls on short-term capital flows” (Stiglitz, 2000). Moreover, Rodrik 
and Velasco (1999) also studied short-term capital flows by conducting theoretical, styl-
ized model and empirical study, following the aftermath of the East Asian crisis of 1997. 
They have concluded that the “potential of illiquidity was at the center of recent crises, 
and that short-term debt is a crucial ingredient of illiquidity”. However, due to ambiguous 
empirical evidence of their study, certain macroeconomic policies were still a subject to 
be defined in a more concise manner, as more prudential monetary and fiscal policies 
as well as greater transparency in local financial system can only be advantageous in 
reducing risks. (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999)    
 
Nevertheless, as short-term capital inflows to EMEs surged from 2000 to 2004, the idea 
of capital account liberalization and its beneficial aspects has again become a major 
theme of macroeconomics research. For example, Kaminsky (2005) highlighted the fact 
that “the explosion of capital flows to emerging markets in the early and mid-1990s and 
the recent reversal following the crises around the globe have reignited a heated debate 
on how to manage international capital flows”. She nevertheless concluded that financial 
globalization in EMEs has provided higher economic growth and productivity, with capital 
flows advantages to move to the most attractive destination (Carp, 2014).  
 
However, after the GFC that started in the USA in 2007 and had enormous spill-over 
effects to other AEs in Europe as well as EMEs across the continents, the need for robust 
policies, capital controls and risk management gain an utmost importance for both, policy 
makers and academics. For instance, Mohan (2009) stressed in the BIS report that the 
failure to understand the risks of excessive capital flows has, in one way or another, 
diminished the financial stability in EMEs, especially after the GFC, from 2007 to 2009. 
It was also highlighted that equity flows, such as FDI, do seem to be beneficial in nature, 
as they provide risk dispersion and expertise of foreign firms, e.g. in the form of human 
capital (Mohan, 2009). However, the effects of debt inflows were more ambiguous and 
open for debate.  
 
Therefore, the type and source of inflows is considered to play a major role in determining 
the relationship between capital inflow surges and economic crashes in EMEs. Accord-
ing to Arias et. al. (2013) from the BIS, the GFC brought very important changes in the 
analysis of the behavior of international capital flows and their volatility; the latter became 
a challenge for policy makers as the negative consequences from capital flows volatility 
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affected some of the key macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth, foreign ex-
change rate and financial stability overall. The results of their research suggest that tra-
ditional push and pull factors, or global and domestic ones, still play a key role in the 
analysis of capital flows behavior, although the importance of those factors depend on 
the type of flow that is being considered (Arias et al., 2013). A more recent study from 
Ghosh and Qureshi (2016) also emphasizes that the source of capital flows – flows in-
duced by residents (asset flows) or non-residents (liability flows) – is an important factor 
in studying the relationship between short-term capital flows surges and financial crises 
in EMEs. Thus, this paper takes into account the push and pull framework as well as 
distinguishes different types and sources of flows for the conceptual model. In addition, 
Broto et. al. (2011) have also emphasized that global determinants of all types of inflows 
have gained in importance within the academic literature and are complicated with the 
conflicting effects of various domestic factors on the volatility of the various types of cap-
ital inflows. Although some of these domestic factors may be tackled by policy-makers, 
it is not easy to identify a single policy track to reduce volatility across many EMEs, which, 
along with the increasing importance of global “push” factors, could explain why some 
EMEs have chosen to “hedge” against the risk placed by the effects of volatility rather 
than to address the roots of such volatility within their domestic factors (Broto et. al., 
2011).  
 
This brings the analysis to the policy question, more specifically the applicability of capital 
controls for the short-term capital inflows. Capital controls have been a hot topic for ac-
ademic research after the major crises incidents in 1990s, 2008 and the current slow-
down in international capital flows. The IMF (2011) has summarized the experiences in 
managing capital flows in major EMEs: according to its research, short-term capital inflow 
surges can lead to macroeconomic disturbance and carry risks of financial distress, at 
least for EMEs with underdeveloped financial institutions and weak macroeconomic fun-
damentals. Therefore, it may be useful for several countries to consider prudential 
measures or capital controls in response to capital inflows (Moghadam, 2011).  
 
In addition, Li and Rajan (2015) have analyzed the panel of 37 EMEs for the period from 
1995 to 2011, in order to figure out the effectiveness of capital controls on the volatility 
of gross equity flows, in particular the FPI and FDI. According to their results, the controls 
on equity outflows, notably on FPI outflows, rather than on equity inflows, have a greater 
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effect on reducing the volatility of equity inflows, notably FDI inflows, suggesting a shift 
to long-term flows such as FDI (Li et. al., 2015).  
 
This thesis contributes to the current literature with the analysis of the relationship be-
tween short-term capital inflow surges and economic crashes in selected EMEs, partic-
ularly BRIC economies. Although today’s literature on capital flows in general is vast, 
firstly it lacks the research on the above-mentioned relationship between surges of short-
term flows and financial crises in EMEs, and secondly, it is deficient in more in-depth 
analysis of the impacts on the EMEs where short-term capital inflow surges resulted in 
economic crashes and sudden stops, as those EMEs have experienced substantial eco-
nomic volatility and a surge of short-term capital flows prior to each crisis episode.      
2.3 Research methods  
 
The research methods of the thesis are limited to the retrieval and use of secondary data: 
that is to all the literature that is available in the academic journals online or in physical 
libraries, given limited access to certain databases. Methodology of current thesis re-
search is constructed within the available conceptual frameworks, such as push and pull 
framework for analysis of capital flows as well as adopted volatility models to study the 
relationship of capital inflow surges and crises likelihood that will be properly presented 
in Chapter 3 – the conceptual model.  
 
Considering the analysis of the selected literature streams that are presented earlier in 
the literature review, this thesis analyses various models for the analysis of capital flows. 
To answer the first research question, that is to find out whether there is a cyclical rela-
tionship between the surges of short-term capital inflows and financial crises, it is im-
portant to determine the drivers of the volatility of short-term inflows, such as FPI, bank-
ing and other debt flows, and their impacts on economic growth in EMEs. In total, the 
sources and determinants of the volatility of capital flows, types and sources of flows, in 
this case short-term capital flows, are the main units of analysis to determine the rela-
tionship of capital inflows surges, economic growth and financial crises in a more general 
spectrum of EMEs. Lastly, with the answer to the first research question, it would be 
possible to assess the effectiveness of capital controls and other prudential measurers 
in the current environment of slow growth, particularly slowdown of capital flows to EMEs.            
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Such analysis would include the use of quantitative econometric models, however, due 
to research limitations, the paper would rely on the existing volatility models and inter-
pretation of the main results of the quantitative research from secondary sources. The 
thesis adopts the methodology of Ghosh and Qureshi (2016), which quantifies the rela-
tionship between capital flows volatility, surges of short-term flows and consequent cri-
ses episodes in selected spectrum of EMEs; thesis also uses the most recent IMF pub-
lication from Pagliari and Hannan (2017), which provides most up-to-date volatility mod-
els with data, to measure the volatility of capital flows in EMEs and foresee the conse-
quences for policy implications. Therefore, this thesis uses a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative research, relying on the most suitable research publications that have recently 
emerged in the changing macroeconomic and geopolitical environment.     
3 Conceptual Model – Key Determinates and Measurements  
 
The following chapter presents the theoretical foundations for the analysis of capital 
flows, that is the conceptual model as the tool for analysis of capital flows surges, vola-
tility, economic growth and crises in EMEs, particularly in the BRIC economies; more 
specifically, it introduces the unit of analysis, that is the type of capital inflows that is 
relevant for further research, the definition of surge of capital flows as well as dependent 
and independent variables that affect the unit of analysis. Such a model would help to 
further outline the empirical model for the relationship between capital flows and eco-
nomic crashes. 
 
3.1 Theoretical framework – ‘push & pull’ and cyclical & structural factors 
 
The key variables are defined as follows: capital inflows represent the acquisition of do-
mestic assets by foreign nonresidents; capital outflows are defined as the acquisition of 
foreign assets by residents of EMEs and net capital flows are the difference between 
capital inflows and outflows (Ghosh et. al., 2016). Capital flows to EMEs have been an-
alyzed under various models and frameworks. However, the most common conceptual 
model for analysis is the “push and pull” framework. Push factors are those that relate 
to global factors, such as the global risk appetite and world interest rates, while pull fac-
tors are domestic ones that constitute attractiveness of a certain destinations for invest-
ment opportunities (Moghadam, 2011). Push and pull framework was first introduced to 
 11 (42) 
 
 
analyze migration and its structural factors in the macroeconomic environment. Those 
factors have gain in significance after WWII with world population increase from 2 billion 
people in 1945 to over 7 billion today (Stanojoska, 2012). Those factors are also inter-
preted within cyclical and structural dimensions: 
 
 
Cyclical 
 
Structural 
 
 
Push 
 Near zero interest 
rates in AEs, notably in 
US 
 Low global risk aver-
sion  
 Slow AEs’ output 
growth 
 Portfolio diversification 
 Rise of institutional in-
vestors  
 Information and commu-
nication technology 
 
 
Pull 
 Domestic output 
growth  
 Low commodity prices  
 High domestic interest 
rates  
 Trade openness  
 Quality of institutions  
 Capital account open-
ness  
Table 1: Push and Pull factors for the analysis of capital flows – based on the various 
sources. 
 
Table 1 above summarizes the main drivers for capital flows to EMEs from the research 
of the IMF (2016) and International Institute of Finance – IFF (2016). The Pull drivers 
constitute the dependent variables that are being studied in this paper to determine the 
relationship between capital flows surges and crises. Push factors are more global and 
therefore independent variables that will have an impact on the relationship between the 
capital flows surges and crises in EMEs, which is the topic for this thesis. The theoretical 
hypothesis on how they relate to each other is thus constructed around the cyclical and 
structural factors in Table 1 above.    
 
In addition to the factors for capital flow analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between 
various types of capital flows and specify a unit of analysis. As different fundamentals 
outlined in the table 1 above vary in significance to the various types of flows, this thesis 
focuses on short-term capital flows, such as portfolio debt and equity inflows and other 
debt inflows, as their surges have caused higher volatility and eventually crises in certain 
EMEs (Ghosh et. al. 2016). 
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The units of analysis of this paper are types of flows, such as FPI, banking and other 
debt inflows, the latter being non-portfolio net private flows. This categorization is out-
lined according to the National Bureau of Economic Research – NBER (1998) in Figure 
2 below as well as Ghosh and Qureshi (2016) analysis of source of flows:    
Figure 2: The highlighted types of short-term flows in green are being analyzed. Source: 
adapted from NBER (Bacchetta and Wincoop, 1998).  
 
Figure 3. Breakdown of sources of flows. The highlighted types in green are being ana-
lyzed. (Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016). 
 
 
Types of Capital 
Flows
FDI – long-term 
Portfolio flows –
short-term, highly 
volatile
Debt
Equity
Other investments 
and debt inflows 
Non – portfolio net 
private flows –
mostly short-term 
(e.g. banking flows) 
Non – portfolio net 
government flows 
Sources of capital 
flows
Liability flows -
to/from non-
residents or foreign 
investor
Debt
Foreign -
currency 
denominated 
debt
Local-currency 
denominated 
debt
Equity 
Asset flows -
to/from residents or 
local investor
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The definitions of each major group of flows is taken from recent IMF working paper by 
Pagliari and Hannan (2017, p.8): 
 
1) ‘Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), “a category of cross-border investments asso-
ciated with a resident in one economy having control or a significant degree of 
influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another econ-
omy”; 
2) Portfolio flows, “defined as cross-border transactions and positions involving debt 
or equity securities, other than those included in direct investment or reserve as-
sets”; 
3) Other flows, “a residual category that includes positions and transactions other 
than those included in direct investment, portfolio investment, financial deriva-
tives and employee stock options, and reserve assets”, classified in government-
related flows and private flows (bank and non-bank flows). 
3.2 Volatility modelling and crisis likelihood by the type of flow  
 
It is also important to provide the measurement of the volatility of capital flows with the 
response to different push and pull factors as well as cyclical and structural ones. Vola-
tility of capital flows will help to further establish the clearer picture of the types of capital 
flows that are the most volatile, surges of which will likely result in the crisis episode in 
EMEs. Also, measuring and explaining the volatility of capital flows and its impact on 
economic growth will help to determine whether global or domestic factors will play a key 
role for policy makers, considering capital controls on either capital inflows or outflows. 
The model is adapted from that of Neumann et. al. (2009) and IMF (2007), which uses 
the standard deviation of capital flows over an ongoing annual period of data: 
 
(1)  
                       , 
 
Equation 1. Standard deviation of capital flows over a rolling window (RW).  
Source: Broto et. al. (2011) 
where, 𝜇=1/𝑛(Σt k=𝑡−(𝑛−1)) of 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑘 and 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑘 denotes capital flows in country i in 
period k. 
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However, considering the drawbacks of the standard deviation, particularly that the vol-
atility is underestimated when the shock period happens and overestimated after such a 
period, Pagliari and Hannan (2017) use the standard deviations of the residuals obtained 
from the ARIMA (1,1,0) - AutoRegressive Integrated Moving Average – model. 
 
ARIMA(p,d,q) model as a whole is defined as the more general model of ARMA – Auto-
regressive Moving Average. ARIMA model general class of models for forecasting a time 
series which can be made to be “stationary” by differencing (if necessary), perhaps in 
conjunction with nonlinear transformations such as logging or deflating (if necessary) 
(Nau, R., 2017).      
 
First, the residuals from the following AR(1) process are estimated: 
 
(2)  
 
Equation 2. ARIMA model: AutoRegressive (AR) moving average process.  
Source: Pagliari and Hannan (2017) 
 
Secondly, the test is performed to detect the presence of any ARCH - AutoRegressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity – effects in the residuals. If the null hypothesis of 
heteroscedasticity is rejected, then the following equation is used:    
 
(3)  
 
Equation 3. AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test.  
Source: Pagliari and Hannan (2017) 
 
(G)ARCH – (Generalized) AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity – models are 
common tools in applied econometrics for finance to determine ‘how much one variable 
will change in response to a change in some other variable’ (Engle, 2001). In other words, 
the goal of these models is to provide a volatility measure, like standard deviation, that 
can be applicable to risk management in financial terms.    
The estimates for the GARCH model are generally defined as follows: 
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(4)  
                                           , 
 
Equation 4. GARCH (1,1) estimated standard deviations.  
Source: Pagliari and Hannan (2017) 
 
where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ≡ (𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑣𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) ∆𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡, in country i and time period t, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is a Gaussian white noise process and 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 is the corresponding conditional variance. 
(Pagliari and Hannan, 2017).  
 
However, due to stated caveats of other similar models (G)ARCH models, such as the 
data scarcity, which can lead to computational deviations, possible biases in small 
samples and other specific conditions, in case not met, makes GARCH not suitable, the 
following conceptual model relies on the standard deviations of residuals obtained from 
the ARIMA model. 
 
Finally, the model on the actual relationship between short-term capital flows surges and 
crises is adapted from Ghosh et. al. (2016). The surge episodes of capital flows are 
defined as the periods of exceptionally large net capital inflows to EMEs (Ghosh et. al., 
2016). In their analysis, Ghosh, Ostry and Qureshi (2016) have made an empirical anal-
ysis of 53 EMEs globally over the period from 1980 to 2014. Out of 152 surge episodes 
in the full sample, about 20% of those surges ended in economic crashes, with the most 
severe episodes happening around 1997 – the Asian financial crisis, 2008 – the global 
financial crisis, and 2011 – the European and US sovereign debt downgrades followed 
by the taper tantrum in 2013. According to their research, both domestic and global fac-
tors would be relevant for the analysis, with special attention being put on the timing of 
the variables. Therefore, as the crash endings are defined to occur within the next two 
years after surge episodes, changes in global conditions are defined as the average in 
the two post – episode years relative to the average over the episode. At the same time 
changes in the domestic factors are defined as average values over the surge episode 
relative to those in the year before the episode began. (Ghosh et. al., 2016). Therefore, 
the mathematical model to establish a link between capital inflows and financial (i.e., 
banking or currency) crises takes the following form: 
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(5)  
     
Equation 5. Estimation of the crisis episodes during capital flow surges in EMEs. 
Source: Ghosh and Qureshi (2016). 
 
where “𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝑡  is is an indicator variable of whether a banking or currency crisis occurs 
in country j (j and i in previous equations serve for the same country) in period t; k 
indicates net financial flows (in percent of GDP) prior to the onset of the crisis; and z 
includes relevant control variables such as (lagged) real GDP growth, fiscal balance, 
stock of foreign exchange reserves (in percent of GDP), inflation, exchange rate regime, 
real GDP per capita, as well as country-specific and year effects.1” (Ghosh and Qureshi, 
2016). 
 
To summarize, below are the building blocks of a thesis structure in an issue tree form: 
3rd level:
Avenues to conduct the 
analysis
2nd level:
Main issues to analyze
1st level:
Research aim
Identify whether the volatility 
of short-term capital flows 
results in adverse 
consequences in EMEs and 
what policies need to be 
considered 
Key determinants and 
measurements of capital 
flows volatility 
Measurements: ARIMA. 
Standard Deviation over RW 
and
Crisis Likelihood
Analysis by type and source 
of flows: gross and net flows, 
asset flows and liability flows  
Effects of short-term or 
private capital flows 
volatility
Push and Pull Framework
Debt structure and reserve 
accumulation
Policies to address the 
volatility of short-term 
capital flows
Cyclicality of macroeconomic 
policies
Capital controls as prudential 
measures
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4 Evolution and effects of capital flows volatility over time 
 
International capital flows have grown considerably over the last 3 decades. One of the 
most recent IMF working papers by Pagliari and Hannan (2017, p.5) has summarized 
the evolution of capital flows in AEs as well as Emerging Markets and Developing Econ-
omies (EMDEs), showing a remarkable rise of cross-border capital flows from 1980s to 
2016. Within this period, both, gross and net flows, dropped sharply for AEs and EMDEs 
in 2008, following GFC, and in 2011, amid the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, as de-
picted in Figure 4 below:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Cross border capital flows in AEs and EMDEs. flows are expressed as % 
share of group GDP. Dashed lines are quarterly moving averages. Source: Pagliari 
and Hannan (2017). 
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One of the key observations here is that the patterns of net flows for EMDEs are mainly 
characterized by gross inflows since the key driver for capital flows to EMDEs are foreign 
investments into domestic assets with low amount of domestic investments abroad at 
the same time. Thus, it is important to distinguish between gross and net flows when 
measuring volatility of capital flows.     
 
4.1 Analysis by type and source of flows 
 
Using the 3 equations from the conceptual model for volatility measurement – Standard 
Deviation over RW, ARIMA model as well as ARCH estimated effects on the residuals – 
Figure 5 below, from Pagliari and Hannan (2017), shows that volatility of total flows, using 
3 measures, on average remains similar in its development from the year of 2000 to 
2016.  
 
 
Figure 5. Development of capital flows volatility in EMDEs (total flows). Note: Measures 
are expressed as % share of total GDP. Source: Pagliari and Hannan, 2017.  
 
The main driver for volatility of net flows for EMDEs is the volatility of gross inflows, which 
outpacing the volatility for gross outflows. Thus, volatility of net flows for EMDEs is on 
average higher than the those of AEs, where volatility for outflows tend to diminish the 
volatility of inflows, reducing the volatility of net flows. One of the possible ‘red flags’ is 
the fact that the average volatility from 3 measurements for total flows is about the same 
        Pre GFC     Post GFC         Pre GFC      Post GFC 
        Pre GFC    Post GFC 
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now as in the pre GFC estimates, while the volatility of gross inflows is higher now than 
in the pre GFC environment.  
 
Therefore, it is important to focus on gross inflows for EMEs, as they significantly affect 
the volatility of capital flows and eventually a crisis estimate for EMEs. Breaking down 
the results by type of flow, it is evident that short-term flows, such as FPI, bank and other 
debt flows are more volatile than long-term flows, such as FDI. By conducting a more 
closer analysis, IMF estimates from Pagliari and Hannan (2017) align with other aca-
demic sources in that portfolio debt flows transmit higher levels of volatility than portfolio 
equity flows. Figure 6 below, which shows the evolution of ARIMA volatility estimates, 
gives insights into the dynamics of capital flows: it is certain that the primary type of short-
term capital flow, which accounts for highest volatility levels, is ‘other’ flows, followed by 
portfolio flows, with portfolio debt being more volatile than equity.             
 
Figure 6. Development of the ARIMA volatility estimates of aggregate gross capital in-
flows and their components in EMDEs over time. Note: measures are expressed as % 
of group GDP. Source: Pagliari and Hannan (2017). 
 
 
 
 
FDI            Portfolio Total            Other            Total 
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Given a high relevance of the ‘other’ capital flows, they need to be more comprehensively 
analysed. As per Figure 2 in the conceptual model, ‘other’ investment and debt flows 
consist of non-portfolio private flows, such as bank flows, and non-portfolio governmental 
flows, such as trade capital flows and taxes. In other words, they can be grouped into 
flows to the private sector and flows to the public sector. The former one constitute ma-
jority of flows in the composition of ‘other’ inflows. (Pagliari and Hannan, 2017). The total 
aggregate inflows from the private sector have considerably diminished and temporary 
stopped in times of GFC; in the post GFC environment, total private inflows have even-
tually slowed down, with two reversal episodes with negative growth in 2015 and 2016.  
 
As per the volatility of other flows, it is evident from Figure 7 below that the flows in the 
private sector are considerably more volatile compared to the official or public sector, 
which stabilized around 0.8 percentage points. Overall, it can be concluded that volatility 
of other inflows is mainly driven by private flows, with similar volatility levels for banks 
and non-banks.       
 
 
Figure 7. Volatility of ‘other’ gross capital inflows in EMDEs, broken down by the sub-
types. Notes: measures are expressed as % share of group GDP. Source: Pagliari 
and Hannan (2017) 
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Another important unit of analysis is the source of inflows. In other words, it is the resi-
dency of investor, as capital flows could come from the domestic investors or non-resi-
dent foreign investors. Although a little systematic empirical evidence is available to de-
termine if the residency of the investor matter compared to macroeconomic fundamen-
tals, recent IMF study shows that the net flows are useful in accessing the macroeco-
nomic imbalances, while the liability and asset flows, summed together as the ‘gross’ 
flows, are better in the analysis of financial vulnerabilities. (Ghosh et. al. 2016) The re-
sults from the IMF research show that the riskiest form of short-term flows are the debt 
flows to non-resident investors denominated in foreign currency, the main channel for 
which is the overvalued real exchange rate regime, as per the macroeconomic imbal-
ances. In addition to the exchange rate regime, economic overheating is another channel 
for macroeconomic imbalances, through which it results in higher inflation and positive 
output gaps, indicating an outperforming economy that manages the actual output on a 
higher volume than country’s full-capacity output. The main channel for financial stability 
risks or vulnerabilities is domestic credit growth. As a result of such credit booms and 
easily available capital, banks tend to lower lending standards and loan quality, causing 
swift inflation of asset prices, creating an unsustainable model for growth. Thus, it can 
be argued that capital inflows are in fact expansionary, meaning that they fuel rapid credit 
growth and boom-bust cycles (Blanchard et. al., 2015).  
 
4.2 Push and pull framework analysis and crisis likelihood estimations 
 
The empirical results suggest strong correlation between capital inflow surges and finan-
cial crises in EMEs in general and in BRIC economies in particular. The highly synchro-
nized nature of capital flow surges and economic crashes suggests that global, or push 
factors matter in determining the effects of those capital surges, while the diversity of 
results proposes that the multiplicity of types of capital flows respond to the various mac-
roeconomic fundamentals differently. 
 
The traditional view on capital flows, the neoclassical theory, states that the main drivers 
of capital flows are the countries’ return differentials (Bonizzi, 2013). In the absence of 
capital controls, the flows would be directed to the countries where resources are scarce. 
That would enable countries to improve the results of inter temporal consumption, which 
stands for economic theory that explains people’s purchase behavior and preferences in 
terms of consumption and savings. That would in turn provide countries the opportunity 
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to lend the money abroad in order to fund other lucrative projects or to borrow money at 
a lower rate than it would have been done domestically in order to finance local invest-
ments of EMEs. Therefore, the definition of the current account fits into the traditional 
neoclassical theory, which states that CA (current account) = Savings (S) – Investments 
(I) (Bonizzi, 2013). In general, the classical view on capital flows is well summarized by 
Brunnermeier et. al. (p.6, 2012):  
 
“Capital flows are traditionally viewed as the financial counterpart to savings and invest-
ment decisions, in line with the narrative of capital flowing “downhill” from capital rich 
countries with lower rates of return to capital-poor countries with higher returns. From 
this perspective, the focus is typically on net capital flows, since that is what counts for 
funding a country’s borrowing requirements.” (Brunnermeier et al., p.6., 2012). 
 
However, judging from the financial crises since the 1990’s and the current slowdown in 
capital flows to EMEs that were followed by the high volatility of short-term capital flows, 
such as portfolio investments and non-portfolio capital flows, e.g. bank flows, the results 
are less clear-cut for EMEs, and especially for BRIC economies. 
 
 
Figure 8. The major waves of net capital inflows and crises in EMEs in (in USD bln). 
Sources: Pagliari and Hannan, 2017; Moghadam, 2011.  
 
Latin America 
Debt Crisis 
East Asian Financial 
Crisis 
Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) 
Wave 
1 
Wave 
3 
Wave 
2 
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In accordance with Figure 8 above, from 1980s to 2016, EMEs have experienced three 
major waves of capital inflows that were followed by the crisis episodes. As per IMF 
estimates, the waves happened around 1990s, 2008 and 2010 – 2012: 1990s were char-
acterized by several severe crises in EMEs, such as the ‘Tequila crisis’ in Mexico in 1995 
and the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, or the “Asian Contagion”, both of which repre-
sented the spillover effect from the US interest rate differentials and dependence on the 
US dollar and were followed by the crisis in Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 
2001, lastly following the GFC, which started in the US in 2007, resulting in a fatal crash 
for a global economy. In addition to those 3 waves, one more wave of net capital inflows 
happened before the Latin America Debt Crisis in 1982, when foreign debt reached its 
peak and major Latin American countries were not able to repay. The wave of capital 
flows from 2010 was characterized by the sharp increase of portfolio inflows, also de-
picted by the Figure 6, both in absolute monetary term and as the percent of GDP. 
Following those developments, portfolio flows to EMEs have been characterized by high 
levels of volatility, which is shown by the Figure 6 as well. 
 
Indeed, the above estimates are consistent with the results of the report from Interna-
tional Institute of Finance (2015) – the global association of financial industry – show-
casing that portfolio, debt and bank inflows have been negatively affected by the global 
risk aversion as a global factor, which has gained in importance since the Global Financial 
Crisis happened in 2007/2008. In addition, the increase of interest rates in the global 
environment, particularly in the AEs such as those of US, has a significant adverse impact 
on portfolio and bank inflows, although the results are more controversial for the bank 
inflows. 
  
In terms of the pull or domestic factors, it is evident that domestic economic performance 
is an important driver of portfolio flows to EMEs; the banking inflows are mainly driven 
by the domestic output growth, domestic return and country’s risk indicators. (Koepke, 
2015). The empirical results for the push and pull factors are summarized in the table 
below:  
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Type Driver FPI Equity FPI Debt 
 
 
 
 
Push 
Global risk 
aversion 
Significant (statistical) 
negative relationship 
(i.e. risk aversion rises 
 portfolio inflows fall) 
Significant (statisti-
cal) negative relation-
ship 
 
AEs (largely 
US) interest 
rate differen-
tials 
Significant (statistical) 
negative relationship 
 
Significant (statisti-
cal) negative relation-
ship 
 
AEs output 
growth 
Partial evidence for 
positively correlated re-
lationship 
Partial evidence for 
positively correlated 
relationship 
 
 
Pull 
Domestic out-
put growth 
Significant (statistical) 
positive relationship 
Significant (statisti-
cal) positive relation-
ship 
Asset returns Partial evidence for 
positively correlated re-
lationship 
Partial evidence for 
positively correlated 
relationship 
Domestic Risk 
indicators 
Some evidence for 
negatively correlated 
relationship 
Some evidence for 
negatively correlated 
relationship 
Type Driver Bank flows Other flows 
 
 
 
Push 
Global risk 
aversion 
Significant (statistical) 
negative relationship 
 
Some evidence for 
negatively correlated 
relationship 
AEs (largely 
US) interest 
rate differen-
tials 
Some evidence for 
negatively correlated 
relationship 
Some evidence for 
positively correlated 
relationship 
AEs output 
growth 
No established rela-
tionship 
Little evidence for 
negatively correlated 
relationship 
 
 
Pull 
Domestic out-
put growth 
Significant (statistical) 
positive relationship 
Not enough data / lit-
tle relevance 
Asset returns Significant (statistical) 
positive relationship 
Not enough data / 
little relevance 
Domestic Risk 
indicators 
Significant (statistical) 
negative relationship 
Not enough data / 
little relevance  
 
Table 2. Key results for Push and Pull factors for analysis of capital flows. Sources: 
Koepke, 2015; Hannan, 2017.  
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Taking those factors into account, it is possible to address the first research question of 
this paper, which is the following: is there a cyclical relationship between short-term 
capital inflow surges, such as portfolio investment and debt inflows, their volatility and 
subsequent economic disturbance in EMEs? According to Ghosh et. al. (2016), it is nec-
essary to first account for the changes in the global factors and their impact on the 
possibility for the crisis episode for in EMEs. The results of the empirical analysis are 
presented in the Table 3 below:   
 
Table 3. Crisis probability by type of flow. Source: Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016. 
 
According to the statistical results of the Equation 5 from conceptual model, that assess 
the crisis likelihood in EMEs, results of which are summarized in the table 3 above, 
changes in AEs interest rates differentials, that of US in this case, investor risk aversion 
and commodity prices, e.g. the oil prices, are highly synchronized with the subsequent 
economic crashes that occur after a high volume of short-term capital inflows. For in-
stance, the probability of the crisis episode increase by 6 percentage points in case of 
the US interest rate hike of 100 basis points against to no change in the level of the 
Crisis type Banking  Currency 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Asset flows/GDP 
0.050 0.026     0.067 0.114     
(0.018) (0.023)     (0.037) (0.064)     
Liability flows/GDP 
0.046 0.025     0.041 0.045     
(0.017) (0.023)     (0.019) (0.026)     
Net FDI flows/GDP 
    –0.069 –0.150     0.007 –0.083 
    (0.053) (0.076)     (0.048) (0.067) 
Net portfolio flows/GDP 
    0.041 –0.011     0.052 0.020 
    (0.022) (0.026)     (0.032) (0.029) 
Net other inv. 
flows/GDP 
    0.070 0.051     0.046 0.104 
    (0.023) (0.025)     (0.023) (0.047) 
Real effective exchange 
rate (REER) 
 
0.024 
 
(0.011) 
 
0.024 
 
(0.012) 
 
0.060 
 
(0.012) 
 
0.063 
 
(0.013) 
Reserves/GDP 
–0.047 –0.030 –0.041 –0.023 –0.112 –0.095 –0.112 –0.091 
(0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.027) (0.042) (0.050) (0.043) (0.049) 
Real GDP growth 
–0.009 –0.025 –0.005 –0.017 0.018 0.071 0.016 0.082 
(0.022) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) (0.025) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027) 
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interest rate for the short-term lending. At the same time, when the global risk aversion 
increases twofold, the probability of the crisis increases by 2 percentage points. Further-
more, the effects on asset flows and liability flows are broadly similar on the crisis likeli-
hood: e.g. a 10% GDP surge in capital inflows from either residents or non-residents, 
increases the probability of banking or currency crisis by 2 ppt. (Ghosh et. al. 2016). In 
order to visually demonstrate key results for push and pull as well as structural and 
cyclical factors, Figure 9 below shows the coefficient of some of the key drivers from 
Table 2, multiplied by the average value of the independent variable (Hannan, 2017)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Net and Gross Inflows across various instruments as a percent of GDP. Source: 
Hannan, 2017. 
 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that there is a rising frequency of capital inflow 
surges and subsequent economic crashes in EMEs. Particularly, it is evident that certain 
types of flows, such as portfolio and other debt inflows are more likely to be associated 
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with the crisis episodes. Considering the importance of the global factors and the fact 
that they are driven by foreign investors, it is important to address the issue of capital 
controls and other prudential measures, analyzed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
   
4.3 Reserve accumulation, debt composition and dynamics of capital flows in EMEs 
 
One of the key distinction of EMEs is the atypical composition of their debt, which is one 
of the reasons being prone to financial crisis. The key change since the financial crises 
of 1990s is that EMEs have enormously developed their domestic debt compositions 
(Mehl and Reynaud, 2005). In total, net government debt increased from $1.3 trillion in 
2000 to $6.3 trillion in 2013, which accounts for almost half of the size of the US Treasury 
markets, the world biggest and most liquid market (Klingebiel, 2014). Figure 10 below 
demonstrates the explosive growth in emerging markets (EM) local currency, i.e. domes-
tic (DX) debt. Well-developed EM DX debt markets in local currency can function as a 
hedge against capital flows volatility, foreign exchange movements and be an internal 
source of financing in the case of insufficiency of external funding. Thus, it means that 
EMEs could secure themselves from the risk of volatile exchange rates and risk of for-
eign-currency (FX) denominated debt.       
Figure 10. Rapid growth of EM DX debt. Source: Franklin Templeton Investments, 2017 
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Transformation of EM debt market generally helped EMEs to turn away from the problem 
of accumulating FX debt – the problem that is also known as ‘original sin’ problem of 
borrowing in non-domestic currency. Hausmann and Eichengreen introduced the term 
called ‘original sin’ in 1999, to describe a situation in which “the domestic currency is not 
used to borrow abroad or to borrow long-term even domestically" (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann, 1999). Thus, the reasons for presence of ‘original sin’ are mainly: a) govern-
ment may need to raise foreign currency financing to strengthen its international reserves 
b) it can be forced to consider foreign currency borrowing only, due to its inability to issue 
local currency debt on the local market or on the international market (Hausmann and 
Panizza, 2010).  
 
According to Duggar, E. and Oosterveld, B. (2015) from Moody’s, there was a steady 
annual growth of 14.4% on average of local currency sovereign debt outstanding from 
2000 to 2014 (Duggar and Oosterveld, 2015). Thus, local currency debt rose from about 
55% in 2000 to almost 80% of the total debt in 2013, (Klingebiel, 2014). Figure 11 below 
shows the distribution of DX and FX – also referred to as hard – currency debt by region. 
It demonstrates that East Asian EMEs are the biggest holders of local currency debt, 
while Sub-Sahara African countries are biggest EMEs who rely on hard currency debt.  
 
Figure 11. Total EM DX and FX debt breakdown Source: Klingebiel, 2014. 
 
However, foreign investors have been tapping into developed local currency bond mar-
kets in EMs, avoiding near-zero interest rates in developed countries. This means that 
there is the risk of significant capital outflows in EMEs in case of rising interest rates in 
AEs, which was the case in the recent developments of the world economy. Indeed, in 
2014 IMF issued a report where it was indicated that as foreign investors participate 
more in EM debt markets, they create the “demand-side” risk of capital outflows, which, 
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for instance, happened in May 2013, after Bernanke, Fed chair at that time, made re-
marks on tapering of asset purchases – the so called “Taper Tantrum”. The scale of 
foreign holding of EM debt is of a decent size: about half a trillion dollars of overseas 
investment went into EM government debt during 2010–12, mainly from foreign asset 
managers.  Among other trends of foreign participation are: (a) Foreign participation in 
EM government debt markets has been increasing, however not quite to the level of AEs, 
probably due to the fact that foreign central banks are not yet a primary investor class 
for EMs, (b) Foreign holdings of EM sovereign debt have risen in tandem with the im-
proved credit ratings of EMs (Ebeke and Lu, 2014).   
 
Based on the facts and trends showcased above, it is evident that while foreign partici-
pation can bring credibility to EMEs, foreign holding in FX denominated debt has also 
been on the rise: the findings from Bloomberg and Societe Generale (2016) demonstrate 
that FX debt has risen by $ 1.1 trillion USD from 2008 to 2015, totaling almost $ 3.4 
trillion USD, as per Figure 12. The risks associated with this type of debt are vulnerabil-
ities and financial stability risks in capital flows, with high risk of sharp  
capital outflows, driven by interest rate differentials in AEs and resulting in currency mis-
matches. Indeed, in case of low interest rates in AEs, there is an increase in capital 
inflows to EMEs from foreign investors, i.e. liability flows, due to higher yields in EMEs. 
Figure 12. Rapid growth of FX denominated debt. Source: Societe Generale EcoNote, 
Diaz Mendoza, 2016.  
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As a result of pressure on domestic currency in EMEs, it appreciates, while borrowing 
costs decrease, creating a tendency to accumulate FX denominated debt.             
 
 
In the end, it generally leads to macroeconomic imbalances and financial stability risks, 
with the most severe episodes happened in Latin America in 1982, Argentina in 2001, 
‘Tequila Crisis’ in Mexico and Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, followed by the crisis in 
Russia in 1998.       
4.4 Key results for individual countries and BRIC economies 
 
BRIC economies have experienced severe financial crises and spillover effects from AEs 
in 1990s, during GFC in 2008 and in the recent times, e.g. during the ‘Taper Tantrum’ in 
2013. Furthermore, many crisis episodes were followed by the surge in foreign capital. 
Reconciling with the empirical results presented in the table 4, this behavior puts forward 
the assumption of the cyclical nature of short-term capital flows and crises episodes in 
EMEs. Figure 13 below from Ghosh et. al. (2016) demonstrates the surge episodes of 
short-term capital flows that have ended in crises in selected 53 EMEs, including BRIC 
economies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Surges of capital flows and crises in EMEs. Source: Ghosh et.a., 2016 
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While not all capital flows resulted in fi-
nancial crisis in EMEs prior to GFC, 
some countries were affected more 
than others during the taper talk of 
2013: economies of India, South Africa, 
Turkey, Brazil and Indonesia have ex-
perienced up to almost 30% cumulative 
negative change in their nominal effec-
tive exchange rate (Ostry et. al., 2016).         
It is equally important to not only con-
sider the volatility of capital flows as an 
aggregate measure but also as a 
measure across individual countries in 
order to better understand what poli-
cies are needed to tackle high volatility 
levels and which types of flows need 
more attention than others. 
Figure 14 on the left represents the 
ARIMA volatility estimates for individ-
ual countries for portfolio debt and eq-
uity gross inflows as well as other 
flows, including bank inflows. Key ob-
servations for the BRIC economies 
plus South Africa include the following: 
in the portfolio debt gross inflows, Rus-
sia, South Africa and China experi-
enced volatility of less than median av-
erage of 37 EMEs represented, with 
China being less volatile of all coun-
tries, except Saudi Arabia, which prob-
ably suggests a lower volume of port-
folio debt inflows for this time series. 
Other BRICs have been more volatile 
in portfolio debt inflows, with Brazil be-
ing the most volatile among BRIC 
Portfolio Debt 
Portfolio Equity 
Other Flows 
             
Median volatility for each type of inflow 
 
Figure 14. Medians of ARIMA volatility estimates for gross in-
flows by type of flow and for individual countries. Note: 
measures are expressed as a percent of GDP; in addition, time 
series are not available in public domain.   
Source: Pagliari and Hannan, 2017  
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economies. Almost the opposite takes place within the portfolio equity flows, while all 
BRICs plus South Africa experienced higher than median volatility for other flows.       
 
The overall results for median volatility for individual countries are in line with previous 
analysis for the aggregate measurements, with portfolio debt being more volatile than 
equity as well as banks flows being the main driver of volatility for other flows.  
 
Amid the recent developments for EMEs, China has been a front runner in opening its 
economy to foreign investors and further advancements in financial liberalization. Since 
the slowdown of Chinese economy, Chinese president Xi Jinping highlighted, during the 
latest World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, that China will open its market access 
to foreign investors, thereby reducing the pressure on its domestic currency – renminbi 
(RMB). In other words, China is on the path to attract higher volume of liability flows from 
non-resident, foreign investors and accumulate funds – FX denominated capital. As per 
the previous analysis of this paper, the above-mentioned capital inflows proved to be 
more volatile, meaning that China should be cautious in opening its economy to foreign 
investors. Thus, Chinese authorities should consider a more gradual approach, following 
a strong domestic financial regulation. Indeed, during the 1990s, China has undertaken 
a gradual approach towards liberalization and avoided severe consequences and con-
tagion of the financial crises in EMEs that started with the East Asian financial crisis of 
1997, following the crisis in Russia in 1998. However, China faces more capital outflows, 
particularly in terms of other flows, where the volatility is driven by banking inflows, de-
spite the rebound in the Foreign Exchange (FX) reserves (Johnson, 2016).  
 
According to the article in Financial Times, Wildau (2016) indicates that People’s Bank 
of China’s (PBoC) attempt to use FX reserves to stabilize the renminbi exchange rate 
has generally succeeded in beating speculators, however, amid the delay in Fed tight-
ening of monetary policy, China is expected to suffer capital outflows. As the PBoC was 
intended to reduce the capital controls and let the market forces to set the exchange 
rate, this approach has faded away to restore some stability. On the contrary, PBoC has 
promised to introduce the capital controls, such as ‘restricting the FX purchases by indi-
viduals and halting a program to allow Chinese residents to invest in foreign hedge funds’ 
(Wildau, 2016)            
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5 Policy Implications  
 
In contrast to AEs, where macroeconomic policies tend to be countercyclical, procyclical 
policies have been a problem for EMEs because of the absence of financial depth in 
most countries, resulting in poor management of capital flows volatility and the causes 
of ‘original sin’ problem i.e. accumulating FX denominated debt. Procyclicality of e.g. 
fiscal policy refers to the case when government spending rises and taxes decrease 
during an economic boom and the opposite happens in economic downturn and reces-
sion, while countercyclical fiscal policy is the opposite of pro-cyclical. More than a decade 
ago, Kaminsky et. al. (2004) has identified that capital inflows, fiscal policy and monetary 
policy tend to be procyclical for the most developing countries and EMEs. Among others, 
Coulibaly (2013) finds the “gradual” development of countercyclicality in EMEs policies 
few years after GFC, which he accounts for macroeconomic fundamentals, reforms in 
financial sectors and other developments e.g. the Inflation Targeting (IT). Below is the 
analysis of the policy question, tackling the volatility of capital inflows and countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies in EMEs.  
 
5.1 Analysis of monetary policy cyclicality: counter- and pro-cyclical monetary policies  
 
 
There was a shift in the behavior of macroeconomic policies among EMEs and AEs. 
Following the recent developments, EMEs and AEs monetary policy has become more 
countercyclical over the past decade. Although the improvements are not as uniformed 
as in AEs, some EMEs, such as Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines and Colombia are 
becoming more countercyclical in nature. Figure 14 and 15 below represent EMEs and 
AEs shifts in the policy approach.  
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Indeed, more and more EMEs 
(about 60%) tend to be countercy-
clical in the past fifty years, which 
is the top left and right quadrants 
and especially during 1996-2007 
period, following the AEs in the 
same direction. Figure 15 below 
demonstrates the counter cyclical-
ity of monetary policy over time, 
from 1960 to 2011. Positive corre-
lation relates to countercyclical 
monetary policies while negative 
figure indicates procyclicality of 
monetary policy.     
 
                                      
For AEs, the turning point in time 
was the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods System of gold standard; 
since then policies became coun-
tercyclical in nature. For EMEs, it 
has been quite volatile due to the 
dependence on commodity price 
baskets and its volatility over time. 
(McGettigan et.al, 2013).     
 
 
The key drivers for monetary pol-
icy cyclicality for EMs are: (1) Inflation Targeting (IT): according to IMF findings, imple-
mentation of an IT regime improves the correlation between real interest rates and output 
by almost 0.6-0.7. That is quite unexpected 1.3–1.5 standard deviation improvement. 
Thus, inflation targeting, and everything which it usually involves, should help signifi-
cantly improve effectiveness of monetary policy and stabilize the economy; (2) deep fi-
nancial systems: IMF results indicate that only in countries with moderate financial depth 
and sufficiently developed financial markets with flexible exchange rate regimes stop 
Figure 16. Cyclicality of Monetary Policy over 
Time. Source: McGettigan et.al, 2013. 
 
Source: IMF, 2013 
 
Figure 15. Transitions. Source: McGettigan et.al, 
2013. 
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reacting to capital flows with procyclical manner. That could be attributed to “fear of float-
ing” in countries with less developed financial markets. 
 
To summarize, the IMF input in the analysis of countercyclical policies in EMs revealed 
that EMEs have been experiencing countercyclical monetary policies over time along 
with AMs but not quite to AMs levels; inflation targeting, better institutions and developed 
financial markets in general are the key drivers behind monetary policy counter cyclical-
ity; as a result more often conducted countercyclical policies bring significant economic 
benefits and reduce output volatility (McGettigan et.al, 2013). 
 
5.2 Capital controls as prudential measures 
 
Accounting for promising countercyclicality, the current environment around EMEs, with 
strong dollar, low commodity prices, particularly oil, credit booms and large FX denomi-
nated debt reminds of the previous pre-crisis episodes and is still a concern for macroe-
conomic imbalances and financial stability risks in EMEs, in times of surges of short-term 
capital flows followed by consequent financial crises. However, in the past decade, im-
portant changes took place, namely the development of domestic debt compositions and 
local currency bond markets of EMEs; following those developments, the increase in 
foreign participation in EM local currency bonds; nevertheless, presence of above-aver-
age volatility of portfolio debt and banking inflows as well as FX denominated debt, 
namely ‘original sin’ problem, are presumptuous in a few countries. From this perspec-
tive, there is a great deal of uncertainty in EMEs in terms of policy implications. As was 
presented above, before 1990 the policies tend to be procyclical, however after EMEs 
got more credibly adopting IT policies and free floating exchange rates, they have real-
ized that there is a greater scope for EMs in conducting further policies, regulating capital 
flows, such as capital controls.    
 
As the result of the discussion and analysis presented above, the issue of capital controls 
and regulation is becoming a key issue for policy makers and a hot topic for debates in 
academia in terms of macroeconomic research. Researchers from IMF – Ghosh, Qureshi 
and Sugawara (2014) – have proposed the regulation of capital controls at both ends, 
not only within the recipient country but also at the source country. This idea was origi-
nally proposed by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the architects of the 
Bretton Woods, when discussing the post-war international monetary system (Ghosh et. 
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al. 2014). Taking into account 31 major source and 76 recipient countries – both EMEs 
and AEs – Ghosh et. al. (2014) have found that various types of controls and prudential 
measures at both ends could largely influence the volume of cross-border banking flows, 
for instance, within the source country, the controls on bond, equity, FDI and financial 
credit outflows result in smaller flows. In case of recipient end, controls on bond inflows 
and FX prudential measures are associated with significantly smaller inflows as well 
(Ghosh et. al. 2014). 
However, other researchers are cautious in terms of capital controls implementation. 
Pasricha (2015) indicates that there is little evidence regarding the effectiveness of cap-
ital controls in achieving the desired policy outcomes. The outward investment flows from 
EMEs have important policy implications in terms of capital controls. In case the capital 
control measures had impacted the volume of net inflows, exchange rate or monetary 
policy, the effect was not significant. However, the changes in capital controls do seem 
to influence the composition of capital inflows: the results suggest that EMEs were able 
to reduce gross inflows of resident borrowing of foreign banks by tightening capital in-
flows (Pasricha, 2015).  
Therefore, it is evident that the effectiveness of controls is not certain and thus remain 
open to debate among the researchers. According to IMF recent paper by Ghosh and 
Qureshi (2016) – What’s In a Name? That Which We Call Capital Controls – it is im-
portant to distinguish between controls on capital inflows and controls on capital outflows. 
The controls on inflows have been historically associated with advanced and more liber-
alized economies as they have used those as prudential measures as a short-term tool 
against speculative inflows in the post-war and Bretton woods area as well as afterwards. 
On the contrary, controls on outflows were and are correlated with more autocratic re-
gimes (Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016).           
 
Most of the criticism toward inflow controls can be well applied to control on outflows. 
While it is argued that controls on inflows are persistent and ubiquitous, controls on out-
flows are often pervasive in nature too, being broad-based, heavy-handed and only grad-
ually removed as domestic economy stabilizes. The controls on inflows are more ad – 
hoc in nature, for example taxes on certain types of flows, and usually are removed once 
the tide turns as was evident from the experiences of Brazil, Chile, Columbia and Peru. 
(Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016).  
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Although inflow controls are considered to be ineffective, their use has proved to influ-
ence the general composition of flows to less risky and longer-maturity flows that makes 
them the tools of prudential measures.  
In the last three decades, the word “controls” has received a negative connotation among 
researchers and policy makers who have been the advocates of financial liberalization 
as IMF. Nevertheless, in the recent paradigm change in the IMF thinking and increasing 
episodes of surges of short-term capital flows and subsequent financial crises in EMEs, 
capital controls have been back in fashion. However, the capital controls, in particular 
the controls on inflows, were substituted by the term prudential or macroprudential 
measures such as certain currency-based measures: reserve requirements and re-
strictions on local lending in foreign exchange. Such policies became broad-based ever 
since the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and they tend to be pro-cyclical with the 
capital flow cycle in EMEs (Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016).  
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6 Conclusions 
 
 
As EMEs were becoming more integrated in the world economy, they have a prolonged 
path towards the financial liberalization. Neo-liberalism agenda has been on the front 
page among policy makers in both EMEs and AEs for the past three decades. Therefore, 
EMEs have experienced a trend toward the capital account liberalization and openness 
to foreign capital. However, being exposed not only to long-term flows such as FDI, but 
also to more short-term flows such as debt and equity foreign portfolio and bank inflows, 
EMEs started experiencing macroeconomic imbalances and financial stability risks due 
to high volatility of short-term capital flows. The relationship between the surge episodes 
of short-term capital flows and subsequent economic disturbance and/or financial crises 
in EMEs has proven to be synchronized on the aggregate level. 
  
The key findings of the thesis paper can be summarized as follows:  
 
(1) There is a evident relationship between the surge episodes of short-term capital in-
flows and financial crises and macroeconomic imbalances that lead to financial vulnera-
bilities and sometimes financial crises. Portfolio debt and other investment flows, driven 
by bank inflows, are considered to be more volatile in nature and do not provide risk-
sharing or other benefits to the recipient country as opposed to more long term flows, 
such as FDI, which do seem to boost economic growth and provide EMEs with human 
capital and technological know-how.  
 
(2) The following suggests some important policy implications, such as capital controls 
or prudential measures. In general, liberalization of capital flows can benefit both source 
and recipient country if they meet certain thresholds: those can be the general quality of 
institutions, general financial stability and financial depth as well as volume of DX de-
nominated reserves and low level of FX denominated national and/or corporate debt. 
Without those thresholds, EMEs have experienced severe macroeconomic disturbances 
and high volatility of large capital inflows, especially for portfolio investments, banking 
flows and other non-portfolio debt flows. In general, this thesis emphasizes that capital 
controls should be considered even at both ends, not only for recipient country but also 
for the source country as well as controls on both inflows and outflows, depending on 
the global and domestic factors of individual countries. 
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